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Abstract
We investigate how sociological argumentation diers from the classical rst-
order logic. We focus on theories about age dependence of organizational mor-
tality. The overall pattern of argument does not comply with the classical
monotonicity principle: adding premises does not overturn conclusions in an
argument. The cause of nonmonotonicity is the need to derive conclusions from
partial knowledge. We identify meta-principles that appear to guide the ob-
served sociological argumentation patterns, and we formalize a semantics to
represent them. This semantics yields a new kind of logical consequence rela-
tion. We demonstrate that this new logic can reproduce the results of informal
sociological theorizing and lead to new insights. It allows us to unify existing
theory fragments and paves the way towards a complete classical theory.
Reasoning with Partial Knowledge
Observed inferential patterns which seem `wrong'
according to one notion of inference might just as
well signal that the speaker is engaged in correct
execution of another style of reasoning. (Johan
van Benthem [1996])
1 Introduction
When instances of sociological theorizing are examined from the perspective
of formal logic, a confusing picture emerges. The argumentation seems to be
erroneous; the sets of explanatory principles used in dierent parts of theories
seem inconsistent. This sort of impression easily leads formally minded people
to conclude that the sociological theories are unsystematic and unreliable.
Several papers have recently challenged this view. Each selected relatively
small fragments of theories of organizations, formalized them in classical rst-
order logic, and showed that the basic conclusions were logically sound. These
formalization attempts might engender two objections. Some did not stick to
the informal, verbal theory; these added new assumptions to derive the for-
mal counterparts of the theorems. Others re-interpreted some theorems and
assumptions so that the (classical) rst-order consequence relation holds for
the claimed theorems. Second, they examined only fragments|not complete
theories. Nonetheless, this research shows that some fragments of sociological
theory are consistent if their stated premises are augmented with explicit repre-
sentations of certain (more or less justied) hidden assumptions. Furthermore,
contradictions can be removed by careful limitations of the validity domains
of the explanatory principles; and consistent and sound formalizations of the
theories can be provided.
A key diÆculty facing sociology originates from incompleteness. Typical
theories are in ux. Carefully constrained explanatory principles are not (yet)
available. Nonetheless, the argumentation still follows certain logical principles.
We want to identify some of these principles and show how they operate in the
normal routines of sociological theorizing.
Studying these questions in full generality entails a vast|perhaps impossible|
task. Instead, we narrow the focus considerably. We examine theories in orga-
nization sociology concerning age dependence in mortality processes. Empirical
research provided three dierent tendencies to be explained. Historically these
facts were explained by separate theory fragments, each selected to explain (a
subset of) the empirical ndings.
Certain populations of organizations exhibit a negative relationship between
organizational age and the hazard of mortality. Theory fragments were devel-
oped under the label of liability-of-newness theories to explain this relation-
ship. In other populations, organizations appeared to be most vulnerable not
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at founding, but somewhat latter. A fragment, called liability-of-adolescence
theory, was developed to account for this pattern, especially the initial rise of
mortality. Finally, research on some other populations nds that older organi-
zations have the highest hazard. Theory fragments that explain these nding
are called theories of liability of obsolescence, and liability of senescence, and
network saturation.
No one claims that the various theory fragments hold simultaneously. But,
what should be expected of a not-yet-studied population of organizations? First-
order logic does not give enough room to keep all of these theory fragments on
board; at most one of them can be true. Hannan (1998) formalized these theory
fragments in classical rst-order logic. This eort was only partly successful.
The resulting formulation integrated two|but not all three|of the fragments.
In other words, the formalization yielded two internally consistent fragments
that seemingly cannot be reconciled in rst-order logic. Making sense of this
situation and making headway in rening the theories would seem to demand a
dierent approach. Perhaps this entails use of a logic that imposes less stringent
constraints. We argue that nonmonotonic logic suits this situation well.
Use of nonmonotonic logic in theory building constitutes a substantial de-
parture from long-standing practice in sociology. When sociologists examine
the logic of argumentation in their eld, they invariably employ (often infor-
mally) propositional logic or, increasingly, rst-order logic. We argue that the
predictive power of available knowledge increases if we assume that sociolog-
ical argumentation in general|or, at least in this particular case|follows a
nonmonotonic logic. In this context, monotonicity means that the set of con-
clusions that follow from a set of premises grows monotonically as premises
are added. In other words, monotonicity means that adding premises does not
overturn conclusions that follow from the original (smaller) set of premises. In
contrast, nonmonotonic logics allow the addition of new premises (reecting
new knowledge) to overturn existing conclusions. In such nonmonotonic log-
ics, introduction of premises that would result in contradictions according to a
classical rst-order logic do not necessarily create inconsistency. Switches be-
tween explanatory principles, without further eld-specic stipulations, follow
the generic guideline of nonmonotonic logic: (1) when dierent principles give
conicting results, base inferences on the most specic principles that apply;
and (2) when conicting principles do not dier in specicity, do not make any
inference.
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To identify how nonmonotonicity arises in argumentation, we need to learn
more about the mechanisms that activate and de-activate certain premises. We
follow the following strategy:
 Take a close look at the arguments. Design the syntax of a formal language
to represent their premises and the conclusions.
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Standard technical references on the subject include: McCarty (1980), Makinson (1994),
and Veltman (1996); Brewka, Dix, and Konolige (1997) provide an accessible overview of the
eld of nonmonotonic logic.
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 Identify the logical principles used in this type of argumentation and gen-
eralize them.
 Formalize these principles in a semantics and a semantically dened sys-
tem of inference for the sentences of this language.
 Verify that application of the inference system yields the desired results
and provides logically sound explanations for the empirical ndings.
 Identify some novel implications of the explanatory principles. In other
words, check whether the theory built in this new logic has increased
explanatory power.
We leave to future research two tasks:
 Checking whether new results can be supported empirically.
 Explore the relation between this semantically dened inference system
and other nonmonotonic logics.
2 Theories of Age Dependence
2.1 Liability of Newness
We pick up the line of history of relevant arguments with the famous paper
of Stinchcombe (1965), which makes four distinct arguments for a liability of
newness (LoN, for short).
Arguments in Stinchcombe (1965)
First, new organizations normally lack the technical and social requirements for
smooth functioning: appropriate skills of members, appropriate decision crite-
ria, sensible divisions of responsibilities, development of loyalty, and learning
what can go wrong. In old organizations, the members can have learned the
relevant specialized knowledge and can have developed loyalty to the organiza-
tion. Even when members get replaced, incumbents can convey the necessary
knowledge to newer entrants. In contrast, new organizations have to get by with
the generalized skills produced outside the organization, which normally t the
organizational context less than perfectly, or they have to invest in training. Sec-
ond, new organizations must invent roles and role relationships and structure
rewards and sanctions. The need for much learning by doing lowers performance
in young organizations, leading to higher hazards of mortality. Third, in new
organizations, most social relations are relations among strangers. Thus new
organizations pose considerably higher levels of uncertainty than old organiza-
tions. The need to compensate for such uncertainties takes away vital resources
from the young organizations, and that, in turn, lowers their survival chances.
Fourth, young organizations normally lack strong ties to external constituencies.
This makes it harder to mobilize resources and ward o attacks.
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Stinchcombe makes clear that this story applies best to the beginning of the
industrial age or to the beginnings of the histories of particular industries and
that it might not apply in contemporary societies. He mentions explicitly that
the growing availability of general skills, socially induced capacities to learn,
and ease of recruitment might eliminate this eect. So the LoN might be only
an historical observation that need not (in principle) be supported by facts of
the contemporary world. Nonetheless, researchers exposed the LoN theorem
to testing in many populations of organizations. Much early research found
evidence of a LoN (Carroll and Hannan 2000). Such evidence made relevant
those arguments that, fromone premise-set or another, pointed towards negative
age dependence.
The empirical validity of the LoN story (at least with size not taken into
account|see below) presents a theoretical dilemma. What makes the claim an
empirically justied theorem? We see at least two possibilities. First, some re-
search that covers the whole histories of organizational populations brings into
the picture organizations that were founded in the premodern period that (in
accordance with Stinchcombe's argument) were exposed to the LoN. Further-
more, the tendency toward industrial concentration gives extra weight to these
numerous but small and vulnerable organizations in the early history of the
population. According to this interpretation, the LoN is indeed a premodern
phenomenon; but fossil records of the early history of organizational popula-
tions preserved it for us. Alternatively, the ndings might not be limited to the
pre-modern phase. In this case, the theorem requires a dierent explanation,
one that applies to modern/contemporary organizations.
An Argument in Hannan and Freeman (1984)
One argument put forward by Hannan and Freeman (1984) concerns the con-
tinuing relevance of the LoN. It can be recapitulated as follows:
1. Selection favors reliable and accountable organizations.
2. Reliability and accountability require highly reproducible structures
3. Structural reproducibility rises with age.
4. To connect selection to organizational mortality it seems natural to assume
that whenever particular type (T
1
) is preferred over an other type (T
2
)
then the mortality hazard of organizations of type (T
1
) is lower than that
of organizations of the type (T
2
)
These assumptions imply the LoN theorem (Peli, Polos, and Hannan 2000). For
the purposes of the present paper, this argument simply replaces one, more or
less historical argument with one that applies to contemporary organizations as
well.
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2.2 Liability of Adolescence
After the LoN had been demonstrated empirically and successfully integrated
into theory, the empirical picture became clouded. Researchers found evidence
that the hazard starts low, then rises to a peak, and nally declines again as
organizations age (Carroll and Hannan 2000). Some analysts called this pat-
tern a liability of adolescence (LoA, for short). One plausible explanation for
the pattern works as follows. New organizations are endowed; they begin with
a given amount of capital (nancial and social) and a position in a more or
less given network of ties. Surviving the initial period does not depend on
smooth functioning, because endowments provide (partial) immunity. As en-
dowments get spent down, performance matters more and the hazard increases.
The mortality hazard in a population peaks when most organizations have ex-
hausted their endowments. From then on, the normal process takes over, and
the hazard declines as organizations accumulate reliability, accountability, and
organization-specic human capital.
2.3 Aging, Obsolescence, Senescence, and Network Satu-
ration
Empirical work on organizational mortality began to show a more serious diver-
gence during the past decade, depending upon how researchers handled orga-
nizational size. Freeman, Carroll, and Hannan (1983) noted that negative age
dependence might reect the operation of unobserved heterogeneity rather than
aging and that organizational size, which was not measured in early studies,
could serve as the heterogeneous force. When researchers found data sets that
allowed them to control for initial sizes and subsequent growth/decline, more
than half of the studies produced evidence of positive age dependence (Carroll
and Hannan 2000). This change in empirical ndings motivated consideration
of processes that might generate positive age dependence.
Barron, West, and Hannan (1994) oered several explanatory schema. One
emphasizes the alignment of organizations with environments. If organizations
tend to be aligned with their environments at founding and intensifying struc-
tural inertia makes it less and less likely that they can keep pace with changes in
the environment, then the quality of alignment worsens with passage of time|
aging, in the metric used in standard analyses. Relatively poor alignment with
environments elevates the hazard for old organizations|there is a liability of
obsolescence (LoO).
A second story focuses on daily (more or less routine) procedures. As an or-
ganization ages, friction accumulates and procedures become slower and perhaps
also less accurate. Without maintenance, routines tend to deteriorate; and the
accumulated inertia makes routine maintenance both more diÆcult and more
expensive to complete. Old organizations loose on speed and eÆciency, and,
after a while, they vanish. This pattern has been called a liability of senescence
(LoS).
A third explanation builds on the saturation of possible ties (Barron 1992).
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If extending the web of ties is vital for an organization (say, for the recruitment
of new customers and key sta) saturation of the space of possible ties lowers
vitality. The older the organization, the more likely that its own space of new
possible ties has become saturated. Therefore, older organizations have higher
mortality hazards.
3 Nonmonotonicity in Theory Building
We distilled some guidelines for both syntax and semantics from these examples.
Theory building (at least in this case) conforms to the principle of informational
monotonicity: explanatory principles are not withdrawn, even when their rst-
order consequences are falsied. Instead, they are maintained; and their eects
are controlled by more specic arguments. Thus, explanatory principles clearly
dier from classical rst-order (universal) generalizations, because they show an
informational stability. Our approach conforms to the spirit of Frank Veltman's
(1996) language for update semantics. Like Veltman, we need three operators:
two for the predictions (expectations and derived generalization) of the theory
and one to indicate the genericity of explanatory principles.
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The details of our approach dier from previous developments in nonmono-
tonic logic in how we dene the specicity orderings of arguments. As we explain
below, we build formal models of arguments involving empirical generalizations
in terms of sequences of intensions of open formul.
What do we expect from a suitable nonmonotonic logic? To develop some
intuition, we begin with a simple inference pattern that shows a failure of mono-
tonicity.
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Premise 1. Birds y.
Premise 2. Tweety is a bird.
Proposition 1. Tweety ies.
Now consider the following:
Premise 1. Birds y.
Premise 2. Tweety is a bird.
Premise 3. All penguins are birds.
Premise 4. Penguins do not y.
Premise 5. Tweety is a penguin.
Proposition 2. Tweety ies.
2
We also follow Veltman in assuming that these operators cannot be applied recursively;
we require that they be the outermost operators in all formul in which they appear.
3
This stylized example and the Nixon Diamond (discussed below) are ubiquitous in the
technical literature.
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Although we kept the original premises unchanged, we added three new ones.
What happens to the conclusion that we found justied based on the rst two
premises alone? Not only do we nd this conclusion unjustied, but we are
tempted to derive the opposite conclusion:
Proposition 2

. Tweety does not y.
What is going on here? Compare the two possible arguments about ying.
One builds on a premise about birds; the other builds on a premise about
penguins. Tweety is both a bird and a penguin; so both premises apply. But,
the premise about penguins seems to be more relevant for Tweety than the
premise about birds. Why? Given that all penguins are birds but not all birds
are penguins, the premise about penguins is more specic than the premise
about birds. This dierence in the specicity of the premises accounts for the
dierence in the relevance of the arguments. We want to use the most relevant
arguments available. So, we go for the conclusion: \Tweety does not y."
Where does this (implicit) specicity ordering come from? We argue that
it comes from the third premise \All penguins are birds." One might object
that the presence/absence of this premise should not matter much, because
our common background knowledge holds that penguins are birds. To see that
common background knowledge does not always clarify inferences, consider the
famous (in logic) Nixon Diamond.
Premise 1. Quakers are doves.
Premises 2. Republicans are hawks.
Premise 3. Dick is a republican.
Premise 4. Dick is a Quaker.
Proposition 1. ???
Our background knowledge does not informus about the specicity of certain
premises. Lacking a dependable specicity order, we cannot conclude either that
\Dick is a dove" or that \Dick is a hawk."
Seeing all this, one might go back to the previous example and decide that
the original conclusion was, perhaps, unjustied and that we were wrong to
conclude that \Tweety ies."
4
\Birds y" is a rule|a rule with exceptions; and
we did not know whether Tweety was an exception. Although we should have
waited until we learned something about this, we just jumped to the conclusion.
Well, sometimes we must draw conclusions before all relevant facts are
known|there is an urgency of action (Descartes 1897{1913). We almost al-
ways face this kind of urgency in theory building. We cannot wait until we
know all relevant things about the subject. We often take what we have and
draw conclusions. In technical terms, this attitude is called the closed-world
assumption: we argue from a set of premises as if these premises represent all
that is known to be true. In fact, this very feature of theorizing accounts for
the nonmonotonic nature of much argumentation in sociology and other elds.
4
Without doubt, this would be the reaction of some classically minded logicians.
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4 A Language for Sociological Theorizing
A logic is a formal denition of a consequence relation. In the case of theorizing,
the relevant consequence relation holds among sentences of a language. So it is
natural to start the formal characterization of the logic with a denition of the
language. Let us consider rst what kind of language we desire.
We are focusing on nonmonotonicity, the uncertainty that our conclusions
really follow from the theory as such, even though they appear to be conclusions
of a given stage of the theory. This possibility is frightening, and we would like to
avoid it if we could. If these dangerous beasts are here to stay, we want to mark
them clearly. We do so by dening separate languages for the well-behaved
part of the theory, where the conclusions are safe (and, as such, re-usable in
further derivations), and the part that misbehaves in the sense of showing signs
of nonmonotonicity.
Two kinds of sentences generate failures of monotonicity:
 empirical generalizations (rules with possible exceptions), and
 provisional theorems (theorems derived from generalizations).
The dierence between them becomes clear when we consider their roles in
theorizing. Serious empirical generalizations capture some relevant (and valid)
insight. These are the sentences that yield the \a ha!" feeling that good the-
ories can provide. Neither their validity nor their relevance gets automatically
undermined by any accidental counter-example. In fact, the meaning of em-
pirical generalizations cannot be properly reproduced by their truth conditions,
expressed in term of the number or proportion of (positive) instantiations. They
do not talk about what is the case. Rather, their main semantic contribution
lies in shaping our expectations.
We need extra tools to express expectations. Because they provide insight,
generalizations should be treated as informationally stable in the sense that
extensions of the theory keep them intact. All that might happen to general-
izations as a theory develops is that new insights restrict their domains of ap-
plicability. But, this happens only when knowledge about exceptions develops.
Even new knowledge should not led us to update the empirical generalizations.
New rules get added to the body of knowledge; and new, more specic rules
can|and occasionally do|override older, more general rules.
Provisional theorems (propositions derived from generalizations), on the
other hand, have a haphazard existence. New knowledge might wipe them out
without a trace. They belong to particular stages of a developing theory|they
represent the predictions that can be sensibly formed at that stage.
These considerations set a methodological agenda. The \oÆcial" empirical
generalizations of a theory should be restricted to those that the theorist regards
as dependable and insightful enough to be accepted as permanent assumptions of
the theory. If there are doubts about the future acceptability of a generalization,
then it does not deserve the status of (oÆcial) empirical generalization.
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In the context of an evolving theory, part of the theory can normally be
expressed in the language of rst-order logic (FoL), which follows monotonic-
ity. For instance, denitions and strict generalizations (universally quantied
sentences) are expressed in this way. Assumptions of this sort provide the rm
foundation for a theory. Any sentence that is logically derivable (according to
the rules of classical FoL) from these assumptions counts as a dependable propo-
sition of a theory. In formal terms, the deductive closure of the assumptions is
part of a theory.
We add a new logical form to represent \serious" empirical generalizations.
Study of the linguistic forms of the sentences that express empirical general-
izations shows that it unlikely that they can be expressed in the language of
rst-order logic. Generic sentences are general, but not universal. Although
sentences such as \Birds y" are true or false, their truth conditions cannot
be expressed in terms of truth and falsity about the ying ability of individual
birds or bird species. Even if most birds do not y, the sentence would still be
an acceptable generalization, provided that this is a justiable expectation of
a creature with only one known property: it is a bird. Empirical generaliza-
tions cannot be expressed adequately in rst-order logic, where generality means
universal quantication, because any exception falsies a universally quantied
sentence.
In the strategy we propose, statements of (oÆcial) empirical generalizations
become part of a theory. However, their role diers from that of classical (rst-
order) sentences. Although the consequences of rst-order sentences are neces-
sarily part of a theory, the consequences of empirical generalizations are not.
To learn what a theory predicts while still in progress, certain tests should
be run on the (actual stage of the) theory. In formal terms, these tests are
nonmonotonic inferences. Formalizing such inference requires a dierent logi-
cal form. Nonmonotonic tests concern predictions (or expectations) based on
a particular stage of a theory. Such predictions come in two varieties. They
can express that an object, or a sequence of objects, normally has a certain
(perhaps-complex) property. Alternatively, they can state that one of two (pos-
sibly complex) properties presumably implies the other.
4.1 Syntax
We dene the language (specically, its syntax) to specify the well-formed sen-
tences (or formul). Next, we assign meaning to the well-formed sentences. Fi-
nally, we spell out the consequence notion that ts this semantics. We assume
familiarity with the language of rst-order logic (L
F
, for short) at the level
of such standard texts as Barwise and Etchemendy (1993). (Complete details
of all of the formal structures are spelled out in Polos and Hannan (2000a,b).
Mastery of these technical details is not needed for understanding the general
method and its applications. The technical issues are of interest mainly to those
who might want to design alternative logics for the kinds of sociological appli-
cations we consider or who want to contrast our scheme with other applications
in nonmonotonic logic.)
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It is important to distinguish between open and closed sentences. To x
ideas, we give a small example. Suppose we dene a one-place predicate Org(),
where  is the placeholder in the argument slot. Org(x) is a sentence, which
reads as \some object x is an organization." Such a sentence holds that an
object possesses a property. As stated, the truth of this sentence cannot be
established, because we have not identied the object in question. In technical
terms, the variable x is free (not bound), and the sentence Org(x) is an open
sentence (or formula). In L
F
, we can get a closed sentence from an open formula
in several ways. We can replace the variable with the proper name of an object
(or individual constant), e.g., Org(Intel). In this case, we check the truth of
the sentence by examining the named object to ascertain whether it is in fact
an organization. Alternatively, we can quantify over the variable x (thereby
binding it) by forming sentences such as 9x[Org(x)] which reads as \some object
(in the universe of discourse) possesses the property of being an organization"
or 8x[Org(x)], which reads \every object (in the universe of discourse) has the
property of being an organization." In each of these three revised sentences, all
variables are bound and the sentences are said to be closed.
In sociological applications, we are usually interested in connections be-
tween predicates. Suppose that we have in hand the predicates Y oung() and
Rel=Acc() which state the properties of \being young" and \having reliabil-
ity/accountability." Many relevant sociological propositions assert a relation of
material implication: if A then B. In formal terms, we use the non-logical con-
stant ! to express material implication: A! B (or, alternatively, :[A^:B]).
A typical open sentence expressing a relation of implication might be
Y oung(x) ^Org(x)! :Rel=Acc(x):
A closed version can be gained by, for example, universal quantication:
8x[Y oung(x) ^Org(x)! :Rel=Acc(x)];
The revised sentence states that it is the case for every object (in the universe
of discourse) that if the object is both young and an organization then it does
not possess the property of reliability/accountability.
In dening syntax (and, later, semantics), we refer to sentences (or formul)
with shorthand expressions such as  and  , where  and  refer to some
particular sentences. For example, we might express the last mentioned sentence
as
8x[!  ];
where  stands for Y oung(x) ^Org(x) and  stands for :Rel=Acc(x).
The Language of Working Theory (L
W
)
We construct the language of working theories (L
W
, for short) as an extension
of L
F
. We introduce new types of sentences to express empirical generalizations
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by adding (1) a nonlogical constant: a generic quantier, which we denote as
Q, and (2) a new type of clause to the denition of sentences. The key idea
is that we dene generic sentences: sentences formed by applying the generic
quantier to link two open sentences that share all of their free variables.
Denition 1 (Language of Working Theory) L
W
is the smallest extension of L
F
such that, for any pair of open sentences ;  , the language contains a new type of
closed formula Qx[!  ], where x denotes the set of free variables that  and  
share.
5
This novel kind of formula can be read as \s are  s," or, with an emphasis
on the nonmonotonicity, \s normally are  s" or \ normally implies  ."
The quantier that creates logical forms for empirical generalizations must al-
ways be the outmost operator of formul. This means that the generalization-
forming operation is not recursive. Empirical generalizations pertain to the
world, not to (other) empirical generalizations.
The Language of Theory Testing (L
T
)
L
T
is also dened as an extension of L
F
. We are interested in two kinds of non-
monotonic conclusions: derived generalizations and nonmonotonic conclusions,
predictions for the objects (or for sequences of objects) in the domain of the
theory. We add two logical constants ( and ) and two new types of clauses
to the denition of well-formed sentences. The logical constant  serves as the
\is likely to be" connective, and is the \presumably implies" connective.
Denition 2 (The language of theory testing) L
T
is the smallest extension of L
F
that satises the following conditions:
1. If  is a rst-order sentence with n free variables and a
1
; : : : ; a
n
are individual
constants (proper names), then  [(ha
1
; : : : ; a
n
i)] is a closed formula that
reads as \the sequence ha
1
; : : : ; a
n
i is likely to satisfy the open formula ."
We use open formul to express (sometimes-complex) properties. A looser,
but intuitive, reading is \ha
1
; : : : ; a
n
i is likely to have the property ."
2. If  and  are rst-order ws with exactly the same free variables, then
( ,!  ) is a closed formula of L
T
. ( ,!  ) reads as \ presumably implies
 " or \s are presumably  s."
Our use of the expressions \normally implies," \is likely to," and \presum-
ably implies" reects a substantial inuence of Veltman's (1996) brilliant \De-
faults in Update Semantics," which oers formal semantics for the expressions
\normally implies," \presumably," and \presumably implies." Even though our
research questions led us to a dierent formal semantics, the credit for devel-
oping some basic, dependable intuitions about a domain, which is normally
recognized as very slippery, should go to Veltman.
5
We assume that there are no free variables that they do not share and that there is at
least one free variable that they do share.
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4.2 Semantics
Classical First-Order Semantics
Assigning meaning to sentences in L
F
requires specifying: what objects the
individual constants refer to, what the variables stand for, and what proper-
ties/relations the predicates denote.
6
Individual constants refer to|and vari-
ables stand for|elements of the universe of discourse (U). One-place predicates
refer to properties that can be represented as subsets of the universe of dis-
course. Two-place predicates refer to relations represented by subsets of pairs
of objects/elements of U , three-place predicates to relations represented by sub-
sets of triplets of objects/elements, and so forth.
We can dene the semantics in a systematic manner in terms of interpreta-
tion functions.
Denition 3 (Interpretation functions) A function dened on the set of predicates
and names, , is an interpretation if and only if (i) it maps
1. individual constants to elements of the universe of discourse, and
2. n-place predicates (elements of P
n
) to sets of n-long sequences of elements
of the universe of discourse. (The n-long sequences of the elements of U are
elements of the n-th power of that universe, U
n
.)
We dene the language (syntax) to specify the well-formed sentences (formul).
Next we assign meaning to them. Finally, we spell out what kind of consequence
notion this semantics implies.
For example, Org is a one-place predicate. The interpretation function as-
signs to it the set of objects that|according to an interpretation|qualify as
organizations. This set is called the extension of the predicate. Extensions ob-
viously depend upon interpretations. Acquired is a two-place predicate; and the
interpretation function assigns to it a set of pairs of objects, those pairs for which
the rst component of the pair acquired the second component (according to
the interpretation). This example shows that the order of the components mat-
ters, hBMW;Roveri might be in the extension of the predicate Acquired even
when hRover;BMW i is not in the extension, in the natural interpretation, at
the present.
Among the nonlogical expressions, only the variables do not get interpreted.
Just as pronouns get their denotations from ostensive actions, variables have to
be valuated.
Given an interpretation function and a valuation of variables, we can calcu-
late truth values of sentences. (We use 1 for truth and 0 for falsity.)
Denition 4 (Truth values of the sentences of L
F
)
6
Valuable backgroundmaterial on the semantics we propose can be found in Dowty, Wall,
and Peters (1980) and Gamut (1991).
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1. The value of a term is given either by an interpretation function or by a
valuation. (If a is an individual constant, then it is interpreted by . If it is a
variable, then it is valuated by v.)
2. An identity statement is true i both terms refer to the very same element of
the universe of discourse.
3. The sentence stating that a sequence of objects possesses a property, e.g.,
\Org (BMW)", is true i the objects actually do possess the property, i.e.,
BMW is indeed an organization.
4. The negation of a sentence is true i the sentence is false.
5. The conjunction of two sentences is true i both conjuncts are true.
6. The disjunction of two sentences is true i at least one of the disjuncts is
true.
7. A material implication is false i the antecedent is true and the consequent
is false.
8. A universally quantied sentence is false i there is a counter-example to it.
9. An existentially quantied sentence is true i the embedded sentence has a
positive instance.
According to this denition, truth/falsity depends upon the choice of in-
terpretation. But, not all interpretations are equally useful; some might have
very little to do with the real world. We need factual knowledge to tell which
sets the predicates denote. It is not logic that tells which creatures are orga-
nizations or which creatures have acquired which other creatures. One has to
go into the world and nd out. If no factual information is available, then all
denotations are equally possible. In other words, we have the whole set of dif-
ferent interpretations|possible worlds, in the usual formal language|but we
know nothing about which of these possible worlds is the actual world. When
we learn some relevant facts, the set of (still) possible worlds is made smaller.
A Possible-Worlds Semantics for L
F
The next step is to tell what sets the predicates denote in the various possible
worlds. A generalized interpretation of the language assigns references to indi-
vidual constants and denotation to all predicates in every possible world. We
can use the interpretation function to characterize the semantics of a set of the
possible worlds.
Denition 5 (Interpretation functions on possible worlds) The interpretation func-
tion for possible worlds is a function dened on the set of nonlogical constants
(predicates and names) that denes the extensions of the relevant predicates in
every possible world. (We assume that each individual constant denotes the same
element of the universe in all possible worlds.)
13
The concept of intension plays a very important role in possible-world se-
mantics. The intension of a predicate is the function that tells the extension
of the predicate (the set of those objects for which the predicate is true) in ev-
ery possible world. According to the conditions given above, the interpretation
function assigns intensions to predicates. Given an interpretation, we can assign
truth-values to all rst-order sentences in every possible world, according to one
valuation or another.
We dened empirical generalizations as generic sentences. As we noted
above, a generic sentence is either true or false; but, its truth/falsity gener-
ally cannot usefully be expressed in terms of the proportion of positive and
negative instances in a world (the \inductivist" view). We consider a generic
sentence to be true if the regularity it expresses is present in the world. Carlson
(1988: 33) calls this view the \rules-and-regulations" approach:
According to this approach, generic sentences depend for their truth
and falsity upon whether or not there is a corresponding structure
in the world, structures being not the episodic instances but rather
the causal forces behind those instances.
To provide a formal model for the presence of such regularities, we take
advantage of linguistic knowledge. The linguistic research concluded that the
underlying structure of generic sentences contains two open formul with iden-
tical free variables (Carlson 1977; Diesing 1988; Kratzner 1988). Our strategy
is based on the view that the ordered pair of the intensions of (two) open for-
mul provides a useful semantic representation of the regularity that makes an
empirical generalization true.
We have to dene the intensions whose composition yields a generalization.
We do so by extending the denition of intensions to apply to open sentences
(as well as predicates):
Denition 6 (Intensions of open sentences) The intension of an open sentence is
the function that gives, for every possible world, the set of those sequences of
objects for which this particular (open) sentence is true in that world.
Denition 7 (Rules and regularities) We express empirical rules (generalizations) as
generically quantied sentences. These sentences are composed of two open for-
mul with the same free variables. We model the regularity expressed by the
generalization as the ordered pair of intensions of these open formul.
At a given stage of theory building, all the representations of its empirical rules
(generalizations)|and nothing else|are collected into the set G.
Theory building reects learning. Such a process depends upon our becoming
aware of more universal rules and empirical rules (generalizations). Adding
universal rules reduces the possibilities about how the \real" world might be, the
set of still-possible worlds shrinks. Learning a new empirical generalizations does
not have the same eect. Following Carlson's rules-and-regulations approach,
we assume that learning a new empirical generalization means only that we add
a new item to the stock of empirical-rule representations.
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Semantics for L
W
With these preliminaries in hand, we can represent a stage of a theory.
Denition 8 (Stage of a theory) The stage of a theory is a pair of sets: a set of
(still) possible worlds X , the worlds that can be the real world as far as the (rst-
order part of the) theory is concerned, and the set G representing empirical gener-
alizations.
The idea that a stage of a theory has both of these components corresponds to
the view that both rst-order premises
7
and empirical generalizations matter.
We consider generalizations to be just as real as objects, properties, or relations.
Sentences in L
W
will be evaluated in such stages. The sentences of the rst-
order part of the theory (the classical premises) can be true, false, or undened
in any stage. Intuitively speaking, a rst-order sentence is true in a stage if it
is true in all of the still possible worlds, false if it is false in all still possible
worlds, and undened otherwise.
As we pointed out above, an empirical rule or generalization ought to be
modeled semantically by the presence of the corresponding regularity, because
its truth or falsity cannot be characterized in terms of a true (universally quan-
tied) proposition about the world. Instead of focusing on truth, we treat sen-
tences expressing generalizations as true if they represent explicit generalizations
of the theory and as false otherwise. Their logical impact will be characterized
by the role that they play in inference, i.e., in terms of the conclusions they
(together with rst-order premises, of course) support.
Denition 9 (Truth conditions for empirical generalizations) For empirical general-
izations (sentences of L
W
), Q x[!  ] is true in a stage of a theory if the pair of
intensions of  and  are in G in that stage, and it is false otherwise.
As we construct the situation, an empirical generalization is unambiguously
either true or false at any stage of a theory. It is important to realize that
universal rules and empirical generalizations are stable elements of the theory.
If they are true in a given stage of the theory, then they remain true after any
extensions of the theory. But, as we pointed out earlier, their consequences can
change from stage to stage.
Semantics for L
T
Because we lack a rich semantics for empirical generalizations, we leave it to the
semantics of the sentences of L
T
to characterize the basic intuitions about infer-
ence from generalizations. Loosely speaking, a nonmonotonic test will succeed
if we can construct a tentative|but convincing|argument from the generaliza-
tions. We call an argument based on generalizations a rule chain. A test will
7
It is worth noting that so-called meta-considerations can also be expressed as rst-order
premises. Such considerations include background information such as rules of arithmetic, set
theory, and so forth.
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succeed if we have such a tentative argument that is more specic than all of
the (tentative) counter-arguments.
Rules in the chains represent empirical rules or universal rules (rst-order
premises, denitions, and meta-considerations). Because strict comparisons of
rule chains are needed to test arguments, we have to dene carefully the proper
construction of the chain: which rule can follow which other rule in the chain.
As a preparatory step, we need to dene a transitive and reexive speci-
city relation on intensions. We want to relativize the notion of specicity to
information states. Things a theory tells about the real world include infor-
mation about the specicity of the empirical generalizations. The semantics of
the theory represent the empirical generalizations as pairs of intensions (; 
0
),
with the rst component being the intension of the antecedent and the second
component being the intension of the consequent.
Think of the following empirical generalization from Barron, West and Han-
nan (1994).
Old and small organizations are vulnerable.
The formal counterpart of such a generalization is
Qx[Org(x) ^Old(x) ^ Small(x) ! V ulnerable(x)]
In this case, the antecedent is the formula Org(x) ^ Old(x) ^ Small(x). The
intension of this formula is the function that tells for every possible world which
objects are the old and small organizations in that world.
Suppose we have more information about a set of organizations that we be-
lieve to be an exception to this rule, say handcraft producers (in some industry).
All craft producers are old and small organizations:
8x [Craft(x)! Org(x) ^Old(x) ^ Small(x)];
Craft producers are normally not vulnerable:
Qx [Craft(x)! :V ulnerable(x)].
What should we think of craft producers based on the new information state?
If this is all that we know, then we cannot conclude that the extension of the
predicate `Craft (producer)' is smaller than that of the complex predicate `old
and small organization' in the actual world. It might be smaller, or it might
be equal. Yet, we are convinced that the `craft producer' rule is more specic
for any craft producer than the `old and small organization' rule. If so, the
relation between the two rules is this. In all still-possible worlds, the extension
of the `craft producer' predicate is smaller than or equal to the extension of the
`old and small organization' predicate; and the extension of the `craft' predicate
is smaller in some worlds (where one sees small, old liberal arts colleges, say).
Exactly this relation is what we capture by the denition of the specicity
relation, which we now discuss.
The specicity relation for pairs of intensions, denoted by a v
X
b, is rela-
tivized to the set of (still) possible worlds at a stage of a theory, X , such that
X  W, as follows.
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Denition 10 (The specicity relation for (still) possible worlds) a v
X
b i (a !
b) is true in all still-possible worlds, the elements of X .
To dene rule chains, we start with a given (sequence of) object(s) or a
(perhaps complex) predicate. The rst component of the chain, 
1
, identies
the subject of the argument. If the argument concerns a particular individual
(or sequence of individuals), then ha
1
; : : : ; a
n
i 
1
is the singleton whose only
element is the reference of that individual (or the sequence of the reference of
individuals) fha
1
; : : : ; a
n
ig. If the subject is a type of individual, then 
1
is the
set of objects of that type. Comparison of rst elements in dierent chains tells
only whether the arguments concern the same subject. Unless all of the chains
have identical rst elements, it does not make sense to proceed. If they are
the same, then we want to begin comparisons of rule chains by comparing the
specicity of their second elements (
2
).
A rule chain can be extended beyond its rst element in any of the following
ways:
 The next two elements in the chain are the two components of the semantic
representation of an empirical generalization, such that the rst element of
this component stands in the v
X
relation with the element that precedes
it.
 The last element in the chain stands in the v
X
relation with the element
that precedes it.
 The last element of the chain is the intension of the (perhaps complex)
predicate that we try to test on the rst element of the chain.
Positive chains correspond to (tentative) arguments, negative chains to (tenta-
tive) counter arguments.
Denition 11 (Minimal rule chains) A rule chain of length k, h
1
; : : : ; 
i
; : : : ; 
k
i,
is minimal if h
1
; : : : ; 
i 1
; 
i+1
; : : : ; 
k
i is not a rule chain for all 1 < i < k.
Denition 12 (More-specic rule chains) The rule chain h
1
; 
2
; : : : ; 
k
i is more
specic than h
0
1
; 
0
2
; : : : ; 
0
l
i if 
2 X

0
2
and :(
0
2
X

2
) or if k < 3.
The machinery of FoL allows all sorts of lengthening of arguments (simply by
using tautologies). Adding such irrelevant material to a line of argumentation
would destroy the possibility of comparing arguments sensibly with respect to
their specicity as measured by the length of the chain of argument. We dened
minimal rule chains such that the irrelevant (though sound) logical part is cut
out. All FoL arguments can be reduced to two-element chains in all stages of a
theory. If the argument is rst-order, then there is a v
X
relation between the
rst and the last element of the chain for any X set of possible worlds.
Now we have all of the ingredients needed to dene the semantics for the
language of working theories. We want to express the semantics for  (the
\likely to possess" relation) and ,! (the \presumably implies" connective).
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Denition 13 (Semantics for L
T
)
1.  [(ha
1
; : : : ; a
n
i)] is true in a stage of the theory i:
(a) there exist minimal positive two-element a
1
; : : : ; a
n
{ rule chains, or
(b) there exist minimal positive a
1
; : : : ; a
n
(n > 2){ rule chains, and
(c) if there also exist minimal negative a
1
; : : : ; a
n
(n > 2){ chains, then all
minimal positive chains must be more specic than all minimal negative
chains.
 [(ha
1
; : : : ; a
n
i)] is false otherwise.
2. ((x
1
; : : : ; x
n
) ,!  (x
1
; : : : ; x
n
)) is true in a stage of the theory if:
(a) there exist minimal positive two-element { chains, or
(b) there exist minimal positive { chains, and
(c) if there also exist minimal negative { chains, then all minimal positive
chains must be more specic than all minimal negative chains.
(x
1
; : : : ; x
n
) ,!  is false otherwise.
We can always construct two-element chains for statements that are logically
true, making  and ,! tests succeed for them.
8
Such a rst-order argument
(two-element chains) will always overrule tentative arguments (minimal chains
having at least three elements).
Figure 1 illustrates a pair of rule chains that give rise to a Nixon Diamond.
The rst element in each chain is the singleton 
1
. The second elements are the
sets 
2
and 
0
2
, and the third elements are 
3
and 
0
3
. The \funnels" connecting
the sets represent the regularities that connect the complex properties, and the
heavy arrows represent the conditionalities in the arguments. Here the two
rule chains dier in their implications: the upper one leads to the conclusion
: and the lower one to  . The two chains have the same length and their
specicity cannot be compared (neither 
2
nor 
0
2
is a proper subset of the
other). Therefore, our strategy of inference does not generate a conclusion in
this case.
Figure 2 illustrates the Penguin Principle. It shows a case in which the
inference strategy does produce a conclusion even though two lines of argument
disagree. The situation is just as in gure 1 except that 
2
is a proper subset
of 
0
2
; in other words, the argument represented in the lower chain is more
specic than the opposing argument in the upper chain. Therefore, we draw
the conclusion  .
8
A sentence is logically true if there is no interpretation that would make it false in any
possible world.
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ψ
not-ψ
positive argument
negative argumentγ1
γ2
γ2’
γ3
γ3’
Figure 1: Illustration of the rule chains for an argument containing a Nixon
Diamond
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ψ
not-ψ
more-specific argument
less-specific argument
γ1
γ2
γ2’
γ3
γ3’
Figure 2: Illustration of rule chains for an argument subject to the Penguin
Principle
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Inference Within Working Theories
The inferencing that seems most relevant to sociological work starts with premises
expressed in L
F
and L
W
and builds conclusions expressed in L
T
. To make sense
of such argumentation, we need to dene the semantic consequence relation.
Denition 14 (Rule-minimal stage of a theory) Let 
F
be a set of premises express-
ing universal (rst-order) sentences and 
W
be the premises expressing empirical
generalizations, i.e., sentences of L
W
. A hX ;Gi stage of the 
F
S

W
theory is a
rule-minimal stage if G is the intersection of all those representations of empirical
generalizations that make all elements of 
W
true.
Denition 15 (Implication relation for working theories) Let  be a well-formed for-
mula.
 is a consequence of 
F
S

W
i all the rule-minimal stages of the theory

F
S

W
make  true.
For a formula  in L
F
, logical implication depends only on the rst-order
premises (giving the classical logical implications). In contrast, an empirical
generalization ( 2 L
W
) is derivable only if it is already present in the premise
set.
Examples
9
The rst example illustrates that conclusions drawn from empirical generaliza-
tions are \weaker" than conclusions drawn from universally quantied sentences.
Young organizations face a LoN:
Qx[Org(x) ^ Y oung(x)! LoN (x)];
HiTech is a young organization:
(Org(HiTech) ^ Y oung(HiTech)):
This pair of assumptions does not imply that `HiTech faces the liability of new-
ness', i.e., LoN (HiTech). But, it does imply that `HiTech is likely to face the
liability of newness,' i.e.,  [LoN (HiTech)].
In this case, the present stage of the \theory" consists of one fact: `HiTech
is a young organization;' and the rule-minimal version has only one empirical
generalization: `Young organizations face the liability of newness.' In this situa-
tion, no two-long chain connects HiTech and LoN . But, there is one three-long
chain, which starts with the singleton fHiTechg. The second element is the
intension of the formul (Org(x) ^ Y oung(x)); (Org(x) ^ Y oung(x)), and the
third and last element in the chain is the intension of LoN (x). This is the only
minimal chain, and it is positive. So the test with  [LoN (HiTech)] succeeds.
The second example shows that facts are also likely things. Consider the
following argument, based loosely on Srensen and Stuart (2000).
9
Jaap Kamps helped us by working out similar examples for a related paper (Polos and
Kamps 1998).
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Young organizations are innovative:
Qx[(Org(x) ^ Y oung(x))! Innov(x)];
HiTech is a young organization:
Org(HiTech) ^ Y oung(HiTech);
HiTech is not innovative:
:Innov(HiTech):
This trio of assumptions implies that
HiTech is not innovative:
:Innov(HiTech);
HiTech is likely not to be innovative:
[:Innov(HiTech)]:
Now we can construct a two-long chain fromHiTech to Innov, and this chain
is positive. Obviously, any two-long chain is more specic than any longer chain.
So the test with [:Innov(HiTech)] succeeds.
The next example (based loosely on Baron, Hannan, and Burton (2000))
returns to the Penguin Principle.
Young organizations are innovative:
Qx[(Org(x) ^ Y oung(x))! Innov(x)];
Young autocracy-based organizations are not innovative:
Qx[Autocracy-based(x) ^ Y oung(x))! :Innov(x)];
All autocracy-based organizations are organizations:
8x[Autocracy-based(x)! Org(x)];
HiTech is a young autocracy-based organizations:
Autocracy-based(HiTech) ^ Y oung(HiTech):
This set of assumptions implies that
HiTech is likely not to be innovative:
[:Innov(HiTech)]:
There are two minimal HiTech{innovative chains. The one whose second ele-
ment is the intension of the formula (Autocracy-based(x) ^ Y oung(x) is more
specic than the one whose second element is the intension of (Org(x)^Y oung(x).
The more-specic minimal chain is positive, therefore the test with [:Innov(HiTech)]
succeeds.
Finally, we consider a Nixon Diamond:
Young organizations are innovative:
Qx[(Org(x) ^ Y oung(x))! Innov(x)];
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HiTech is an autocracy-based organization:
Autocracy-based(HiTech):
HiTech is a young organization:
Org(HiTech) ^ Y oung(HiTech):
Autocracy-based organizations are not innovative:
Qx[Autocracy-based(x)! :Innov(x)]:
This set of propositions does not imply either that
HiTech is likely not to be innovative:
[:Innov(HiTech)]; or
HiTech is likely to be innovative:
[Innov(HiTech)]:
There are two minimal `HiTech'{`innovative' chains. The one whose second
element is the intension (Autocracy-based(x) is not more specic than the one
whose second element is the intension of (Org(x)^Y oung(x), nor the other way
around. Therefore, neither the test with [:Innov(HiTech)] nor the test with
[Innov(HiTech)] succeeds.
5 Back to Sociology
This formal nonmonotonic logic for theory building might be interesting for
its own sake. But, the really important test is this: Does this novel formal
approach contribute to our understanding of the sociological phenomena? Here
we try to show that it does, by extending Hannan's (1998) formalization of a
series of alternative formulations of age dependence. The key extensions involve
unications of the various fragments.
As we pointed out above, use of this kind of default reasoning relies heavily
on considerations of specicity of the relevant arguments. We use an intuitive
notion of specicity. The antecedents of the premises (partially) describe po-
sitions of the (a
1
; a
2
) interval on the scale of possible age: say the real line.
Suppose that the antecedent of one generalization says, for example, that a
2
has to be in a given set, and the antecedent of another empirical generalization
says that a
2
has to be within a proper subset of the same given set. Then argu-
ments that use the second empirical generalization are more specic than those
that use the rst. Formalizing what is required to show that this intuition is
correct would not add much to the understanding of the issues we are addressing
here. Therefore, we simply assume here that these intuitions provide suÆcient
guidelines to decide specicity issues.
5.1 Liability of Newness
In what follows, we treat theory fragments that claim the LoN as one theory,
even though there are at least six clearly distinguishable arguments. We do so
because logical analyzes using each yields similar results.
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5.1.1 Reliability/Accountability (Fragment 1)
One way to get the LoN claimuses premises concerning reliability/accountability
(Hannan and Freeman 1984):
Premise F
1
.1 Reliability/accountabilitynormally increases with age at all ages:
Qx; a
1
; a
2
[(A(x; a
1
) < A(x; a
2
))! RA(x; a
1
) < RA(x; a
2
)]:
Premise F
1
.2 Increases in reliability/accountability normally lower the haz-
ard:
Qx; a
1
; a
2
[RA(x; a
1
) < RA(x; a
2
)!M (x; a
1
) > M (x; a
2
)]:
These premises do indeed imply the strong-form version of the LoN claim in the
following format
Proposition F
1
.1 The hazard presumably declines with age at all ages:
(a
1
< a
2
) ,!M (x; a
1
) > M (x; a
2
):
Proof of F
1
.1 To show that this theorem goes through in our new logic one
has to consider all the rule chains that start with the intension of the
(open) formulaA(x; a
1
) < A(x; a
2
) and end in the intension ofM (x; a
1
) >
M (x; a
2
). At this stage of the theory, there is only one such rule chain;
and this rule chain is positive.
We treat these premises and the proposition that follows as the default the-
ory. In other words, this is the rst stage of the theory. These premises will
be included in every subsequent stage. Notice that, because Proposition F
1
.1
applies to any pair of ages, it is extremely non-specic with respect to the scope
of applicability. It will turn out that this default is usually overridden by more
specic premises in the more developed theories.
5.1.2 Endowment (Fragment 2)
The next development introduced the notion of endowments. According to the
endowment-based argumentation, there is a period of given length, call it ,
in which an organization enjoys high survival chances due to the protection
oered by some endowment. We treat the period of normal endowment as a
population characteristic and  as a population parameter.
10
Some populations
face resource-poor environments or intense competition for resources with the
result that newly founded organizations are unlikely to be endowed (Carroll and
Hannan 1989). We can represent this case by setting  = 0. The other extreme,
innitely persisting endowment, does not seem reasonable. So we will assume
that the normal period of endowment is nite.
10
Of course, empirical research might be able to specify the sizes of endowments at the
organizational level. In such a case, the more specic information ought to overrule the
population-level default.
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A(x,a1) < A(x,a2)
RA(x,a1) < RA(x,a2)
M(x,a1) > M(x,a2)
yes
no
Figure 3: Rule chain in the default theory: Fragment 1
Age
H
Figure 4: The pattern of age dependence of organizational mortality according
to the default theory: liability of newness
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A(x,a1) <  A(x,a2)
A(x,a1) <  ε
E(x,a1) > E(x,a2)
M(x,a1) < M(x,a2)
Figure 5: Rule chains in the second theory fragment: liability of adolescence
M
Ageε
Figure 6: Pattern of age dependence of mortality of an endowed population of
organizations according to the second theory fragment: liability of adolescence
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Premise F
2
.1 Before age , stocks of initial endowment are normally positive
and they normally decline with age:
Qx; a
1
; a
2
[A(x; a
1
) < A(x; a
2
) ^A(x; a
1
) < )! E(x; a
1
) > E(x; a
2
)]:
Premise F
2
.2 A larger endowment normally lowers the hazard:
Qx; a
1
; a
2
[E(x; a
1
) < E(x; a
2
)!M (x; a
1
) > M (x; a
2
)]:
These premises indeed imply that the hazard increases with age during an initial
period in which endowments get spent down:
Proposition F
2
.1 The hazard presumably increases with age within the period
of initial endowment:
(A(x; a
1
) <  ^A(x; a
1
) < A(x; a
2
)) ,!M (x; a
1
) < M (x; a
2
):
Proof of F
2
.1 The proof of this proposition follows the line of the previous
proof. It is concerned with the rule-chains that connect the intension of
(A(x; a
1
) <  ^ A(x; a
1
) < A(x; a
2
)) and that of M (x; a
1
) < M (x; a
2
).
Again, there is only one such chain; and this chain is positive.
5.1.3 First Unication Attempt (U
1
)
Now consider the rst attempt at unication: the theory that uses all four of
these premises. We can regard this construction as the second stage of the
theory.
Premises: F
1
.1{2 and F
2
.1{2.
At this stage of the theory, we get the following theorems:
Theorem U
1
.1 The hazard presumably increases with age during the period
of initial endowment:
(A(x; a
1
) <  ^A(x; a
1
< A(x; a
2
)) ,!M (x; a
1
) < M (x; a
2
):
Theorem U
1
.2 The hazard presumably decreases with age after the period of
initial endowment:
( < (A(x; a
1
) ^A(x; a
1
< A(x; a
2
)) ,!M (x; a
1
) > M (x; a
2
):
Proofs U
1
.1, U
1
.2 Now we have to consider the most specic rule chains that
connect (A(x; a
1
) < ^A(x; a
1
< A(x; a
2
)) and M (x; a
1
) < M (x; a
2
), and
( < (A(x; a
1
) ^ A(x; a
1
< A(x; a
2
)) and M (x; a
1
) > M (x; a
2
), respec-
tively. Both two-step chains are positive.
27
A(x,a1) <  A(x,a2)
A(x,a1)<ε
E(x,a1) > E(x,a2)
M(x,a1) < M(x,a2)
RA(x,a1) < RA(x,a2)
Figure 7: Rule chains in the rst unication: combining the rst and second
fragments
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M M
M
Age Age
Age
+
=
ε
ε
Figure 8: The pattern of age dependence of mortality according the rst uni-
cation
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A somewhat surprising corollary also follows from these premises. Even
though we see a period of monotonic increasing hazards and a period of mono-
tonically decreasing hazards, the machinery implies that the hazard in the sec-
ond period cannot fall below the highest value of the hazard in the rst period.
In other words, there is an overall tendency toward positive age dependence.
Theorem:U
1
.3 The hazard presumably increases over all intervals that span
:
(A(x; a
1
) <  < A(x; a
2
)) ,!M (x; a
1
) < M (x; a
2
):
Theorems U
1
.2 and U
1
.3 together imply a nice result about the global behavior
of the process:
Theorem U
1
.4 The hazard presumably jumps at to its highest level at .
Proof: So far we have derived:
Theorem U
1
.1: (A(x; a
1
) < A(x; a
2
)) < ) ,!M (x; a
1
) < M (x; a
2
)
Theorem U
1
.2: ( < A(x; a
1
) < A(x; a
2
)) ,!M (x; a
2
) < M (x; a
1
)
Theorem U
1
.3: (A(x; a
1
) <  < A(x; a
2
)) ,!M (x; a
1
) < M (x; a
2
)
According to Theorem U
1
.1,A(x; a
2
) can be arbitrarily close to , and then
M (x; a
2
) will likely approximate the supremum (least upper bound) of all
of the values of the hazard before . Similarly, in Theorem U
1
.2, A(x; a
2
)
can be arbitrarily far above ; and, then, M (x; a
2
) will likely approximate
the innum (greatest lower bound) of all the values of the hazard after
. According to Theorem U
1
.3, it is likely that M (x; a
1
) < M (x; a
2
), i.e.,
the innum of the values after  is likely to either equal or exceed the
supremum of the values before .
Now from Theorem U
1
.2, we know that the value of the hazard above, but
innitely close, to  is likely to approximate the supremum of the values
after . Furthermore, we know that the set of the values of the hazard
after  has several elements, and therefore the innum of this set is strictly
smaller then the supremum.
If we put all these consideration together, then we can conclude that the
hazard likely jumps at  and the height of the jump is likely to be at least
as big as the dierence between the innum and the supremum of the set
of hazard values after . These considerations also show that the hazard
reaches its maximum at .
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5.2 Superimposing a Liability of Obsolescence
At least three dierent lines of argumentation support the claim of a liability of
oldness: (1) environmental drift, inertia, and the need for being aligned with the
environment: the LoO; the need for smooth operation, and the accumulation
of organizational friction: the LoS; and (3) the need to expand the network of
organizational ties, and the saturation of the space of (possible) ties.
Environmental Drift and Alignment (Fragment 3)
We assume that the quality of the alignment between an organization and its
environment aects its mortality hazard. We also assume that organizations
are relatively inert, that, in the long run, their structures cannot follow envi-
ronmental changes. So, after a period of given length, they will normally no
longer be aligned with the environment. As in Hannan (1998), we parameter-
ize this process in terms of environmental drift. Specically, organizations are
normally best aligned with the environments in which they rst appear; but
environments drift over time. Due to inertia, drift causes alignment to decline
steadily over time (age, from the perspective of an organization). The drift is
such that within a period of length , the quality of alignment does not change
so much from the founding conditions that if aects the hazard. However, be-
yond , the environment has normally drifted far enough as to drive the quality
of alignment below a threshold that aects the hazard. Further drift, after ,
continually degrades alignment.
The parameter  presumably varies among populations. At one extreme,
the environment is so volatile that even new organizations cannot match their
structures, strategies, and routines to the environment. In this case, we can
reasonably set  to zero. At the other extreme, environmental change is so
slow that the threshold of poor alignment will normally not be reached in an
organization's lifetime, that is,  =1.
Premise F
3
.1 After age , organizations are normally less and less well aligned
with their environments:
Qx; a
1
; a
2
[(A(x; a
1
) < A(x; a
2
)^A(x; a
2
) > )! AL(x; a
1
) > AL(x; a
2
)]:
Premise F
3
.2 Superior alignment with the environment normally lowers the
hazard:
Qx; a
1
; a
2
[AL(x; a
1
) < AL(x; a
2
)!M (x; a
1
) > M (x; a
2
)]:
These two premises yield the following theorem:
Proposition F
3
.1 The hazard of organizationalmortality presumably increases
with age after the initial period of alignment:
(A(x; a
1
) < A(x; a
2
) ^  < A(x; a
2
)) ,!M (x; a
1
) < M (x; a
2
):
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A(x,a1) <  A(x,a2)  &
σ < A(x,a2)
AL(x,a1) > AL(x,a2)
M(x,a1) < M(x,a2)
Figure 9: Rule chains in the third theory fragment: liability of obsolescence
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A(x,a1) <  A(x,a2)
A(x,a1) <  ε
A(x,a2) > σ
RA(x,a1) < RA(x,a2)
E(x,a1) > E(x,a2)
AL(x,a1) > AL(x,a2)
M(x,a1) < M(x,a2)
M(x,a1) < M(x,a2)
Figure 10: Rule chains in the second unication
Proof F
3
.1 In this fragment there is only one rule chain that connects the
intension of A(x; a
1
) < A(x; a
2
) and the intension ofM (x; a
1
) < M (x; a
2
).
This rule chain is positive.
5.2.1 Second Unication Attempt (U
2
)
Now we consider the theory that uses all seven premises and one additional
factual premise.
Premises: Premises F
1
.1{2, F
2
.1{2, F
3
.1{3, and one fact: endowment is ex-
hausted before the organization experiences obsolescence:  <  (It will be
discussed later what happens in populations of organizations which does not
provide empirical justication for this consideration.)
In this unication, the third stage of the theory, the rst three theorems from
the rst unication attempt are still valid:
Theorem U
2
:1 (same as U
1
.1) The hazard presumably increases with age
33
MAgeε σ
Figure 11: Age dependence of mortality according to the second unication
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in the period of initial endowment and testing:
(A(x; a
)
< A(x; a
2
) < ) ,!M (x; a
1
) < M (x; a
2
):
Theorem U
2
.2 (same as U
1
.2) The hazard presumably decreases with age
after the initial period of endowment and testing but before the ending of
alignment:
( < A(x; a
)
< A(x; a
2
)  ) ,!M (x; a
1
) > M (x; a
2
):
Theorem U
2
.3 (same as U
1
.3) The hazard increases over intervals that span
:
(A(x; a
)
<  < A(x; a
2
)) ,!M (x; a
1
) < M (x; a
2
):
Theorem U
1
.4 is now limited to the period before the onset of obsolescence:
Theorem U
2
.4 The hazard presumably jumps to its highest level in the age
interval [0; ) at .
And, we have theorems specic to the obsolescence process:
Theorem U
2
.5 The hazard presumably increases with age after alignment
ends:
(A(x; a
)
< A(x; a
2
) ^A(x; a
)
> ) ,!M (x; a
1
) < M (x; a
2
):
Theorem U
2
.6 The hazard presumably increases over intervals that span :
(A(x; a
)
<  < A(x; a
2
)) ,!M (x; a
1
) < M (x; a
2
):
Again we can derive implications about jumps and maxima in the process.
Theorem U
2
.5 The hazard presumably jumps above its highest level when an
organization reaches the age of obsolescence.
Proofs : All the proofs can be read from the diagram in gure 10.
Under specic conditions, the general picture reproduces the patterns of
age-dependence found in empirical research:
Positive age dependence. If the exhaustion of endowments is not completed
within an observation period, all changes in organizational mortality will be
due to decreasing levels of endowment. This yields positive age dependence.
If a population is such that organizations become obsolete before they ex-
haust their endowments, there is no time left for realizing improvements in life
chances due to improvements in reliability and accountability. The rst and the
last periods of positive age-dependence are \pushed together" and the mortality
hazard increases monotonically.
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The full picture can also be interpreted as entailing global positive age de-
pendence: There are three distinct periods: before , between  and , and
after . We established above that the mortality hazard is lower before  than
between  and  and that it is lower between  and  than after . So the
hazard is getting higher in the long run regardless of the changes observable in
the details of the picture.
Negative age dependence. If the population is such that endowments are low or
nonexistent, and the population did not reach the expected age of obsolescence
yet, then the population shows negative age dependence in mortality.
Inverted-U-shaped age dependence. High adolescent mortality shows up in this
picture when the presence of endowment oers some protection at young ages,
the exhaustion of endowments results in a jump in organizational mortality, and
then increasing reliability and accountability lowers the hazard. Here we assume
that the population is not observed long enough to see obsolescence.
6 Smoothing the Process
The mortality process, as modeled so far, has jumps at the end of endowment
and the onset of obsolescence. One can imagine situations in which such jumps
might actually occur, as when endowments reect some xed-length regulatory
protection granted to young organizations. Yet, it seems natural to assume
that the process would shift gradually from a regime of decreasing to increasing
hazards near . So it seems interesting to explore how the logical machinery
and additional sociological arguments can smooth the process in that region.
Consider the onset of obsolescence. We want to create a Nixon Diamond by
nding another specic argument that applies before . Then comparisons of
hazards before and after  would not be predictable because two equally and
opposing specic rules apply to such intervals.
6.1 Saturation of Organizational Networks (Fragment 4)
Here we need to elaborate on three assumptions:
The possibility of extending the network of ties grows once the organiza-
tion survived the initial period within which organizations would normally
have exhausted their initial endowments and/or be subjected to testing.
Organizations can saturate their space of possible network ties, i.e. reach
a stage when hardly any new tie is possible. One way to explain such
a possibility is to point out that network ties occasionally bring about
network incompatibilities: ties to organizations A exclude the possibility
of having ties with organization B.
The more extensive is an organization's network of ties, the lower is its
hazard of organizational mortality.
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We formalize these assumptions as follows:
Premise F
4
.1 An organization's network normally grows more extensive with
age, after the period of initial endowment/testing and before saturation.
Qx; a
1
; a
2
[ > a
2
> a
1
> max(Æ; )! NWT (x; a
2
) > NWT (x; a
1
)]:
Premise F
4
.2 An organization's network normally does not grow more exten-
sive with age after the saturation time ().
Qx; a
1
; a
2
[a
2
> a
1
>  > max(Æ; )! :(NWT (x; a
2
) > NWT (x; a
1
))]:
Premise F
4
.3 If an organization's network expands, then its hazard falls.
Qx; a
1
; a
2
[(a
2
> a
1
^NWT (x; a
2
) > NWT (x; a
1
))!M (x; a
2
) < M (x; a
1
)]:
Premise F
4
.4 If an organization's network does not expand, then its hazard
rises.
Qx8a[(a
2
 a > a
1
^:(NWT (x; a) > NWT (x; a
1
))!M (x; a
2
) > M (x; a
1
)]:
We now get two propositions.
Proposition F
4
.1 Before the normal time of saturation, an organization's haz-
ard falls with age.
( > a
2
> a
1
> max(Æ; )) ,!M (x; a
2
) < M (x; a
1
):
Proposition F
4
.2 After the normal time of saturation, an organization's haz-
ard rises with age.
(a
2
> a
1
>  > max(Æ; )) ,!M (x; a
2
) > M (x; a
1
):
Each proposition is more specic than the one based on the default; but neither
is more specic than the other for max(a
1
<  <  < a
2
pairs. Therefore, we
have a Nixon Diamond here.
6.2 Third Unication Attempt (U
3
)
With these additional assumptions, the hazard can be smooth near  if the pop-
ulation is such that the saturation of possible ties happens before obsolescence
strikes, i.e., when  < .
Premises: Premises F
1
.1{2, F
2
.1{2, F
3
.1{3, F
4
.1{2, and F
4
.1{3.
This fourth stage of the theory yields the following theorems:
Theorem U
3
.1 The hazard of organizational mortality presumably increases
with age in the initial period of endowment/testing:
(a
1
< a
2
< max(Æ; )) ,!M (x; a
1
) < M (x; a
2
):
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Theorem U
3
.2 The hazard of organizational mortality presumably decreases
with age after the initial period of endowment/testing but before the end-
ing of alignment:
(max(Æ; ) < a
1
< a
2
< ) ,!M (x; a
1
) > M (x; a
2
):
Theorem U
3
.3 The hazard of organizational mortality presumably increases
with age after alignment ends:
(a
1
< a
2
^ a
2
< ) ,!M (x; a
1
) < M (x; a
2
):
Jumps in the hazard are consequences of theorems of the following type: and
Theorem U
2
.4:
(a
1
<  ^    ^  < a
2
) ,!M (x; a
1
) < M (x; a
2
):
These theorems say that the hazard is higher after  than before. If we expect
\smooth" transitions between the phases (without knowledge of the actual func-
tional forms of the component mortality functions), then the theory should not
yield any prediction|i.e., it should produce a Nixon Diamond|for intervals
overarching the [; ) interval|and therefore rule out any predictions.
Furthermore we gain the following insight: If the rise in the mortality hazard
starts with a sudden jump, then it is likely that obsolescence strikes; if the hazard
starts to rise smoothly, then it is likely to be due to the saturation of the network
of ties and/or senescence (perhaps acting in concert with obsolescence).
7 Reections
Now after seeing how nonmonotonic logic applies in the context of theory con-
struction, it is time to ask whether the new notion of the consequence relation
changes our understanding of theory. It does not. Tarski's view of theory|a
deductively closed system of sentences, where deductive closure means closure
under the classical rst-order notion of logical consequence|still applies.
The analysis presented in this paper did not deal with a theory in the
Tarskian sense. Instead, it dealt with a theory in ux. And, just as a for-
mer dean is not a dean any longer, a theory in ux is not yet a theory. Instead,
it is raw material for a future theory. Future research might provide evidence
that would override its present conclusions.
How can we get a proper theory from this raw material? Suppose that
enough high-quality empirical work claried the conditions of occurrence of all
of the patterns of age dependence in organizational mortality. Then one would
likely feel tempted to declare that all of the relevant facts are in hand. We
would then want to construct a complete (classical) theory.
The nonmonotonic formalization of the theory in ux can be used to con-
struct the classical theory. We want a classical theory that is not contradicted
by any of the classes of known tendencies. We can do this as follows:
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 take all of the empirical generalizations and restrict them to those domains
where they were not overridden and
 universally quantify them, with antecedents that provide the required re-
strictions.
With this revision, all those conclusions that were \likely" to be the case then
become the case; and the derived expectations (\normally implies" statements)
turn into universally quantied, though restricted, theorems.
For example, suppose that the theory in ux had been frozen into a re-
stricted classical theory after accommodating considerations about the liability
of newness and endowments. Then the former empirical generalizations:
Premise F
1
.1 Reliability/accountability normally grows with age at all ages:
Qx; a
1
; a
2
[(a
1
< a
2
)! RA(x; a
1
) < RA(x; a
2
)]:
Premise F
1
.2 Higher reliability/accountability normally lowers the hazard:
Qx; a
1
; a
2
[RA(x; a
1
) < RA(x; a
2
)!M (x; a
1
) > M (x; a
2
)]:
Premise F
2
.1 Before age , stocks of initial endowment are normally positive
and normally decline with age:
Qx; a
1
; a
2
[(a
1
< a
2
^ a
1
< )! E(x; a
1
) > E(x; a
2
) > 0]:
Premise F
2
.2 A larger endowment normally lowers the hazard:
Qx; a
1
; a
2
[E(x; a
1
) < E(x; a
2
)!M (x; a
1
) > M (x; a
2
)]:
will be reformulated as (constrained) universal sentences as follows:
Premise F
1
.1
0
. Reliability/accountability grows with age after :
8x; a
1
; a
2
[( < a
1
< a
2
)! RA(x; a
1
) < RA(x; a
2
)]:
This formula diers from [Premise F
1
.1] in two respects. Its variables are
bound by a universal quantier instead of the generic quantier, and the
applicability domain is restricted to periods being positioned after . The
latter restriction follows the domain restriction to the portion of the age
range in which the process is not overridden.
Premise F
1
.2
0
. Higher reliability/accountability lowers the hazard:
8x; a
1
; a
2
[RA(x; a
1
) < RA(x; a
2
)!M (x; a
1
) > M (x; a
2
)]:
This formula diers from [Premise F
1
.2] in only one respect: its variables
are bound by a universal quantier instead of the generic quantier.
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Premise F
2
.1
0
. Before age , stocks of initial endowment are positive and de-
cline with age:
8x; a
1
; a
2
[(a
1
< a
2
;^a
1
< )! E(x; a
1
) > E(x; a
2
) > 0]:
This formula also diers from [Premise F
2
.1] in one respect: its variables
are bound by a universal quantier instead of the generic quantier.
Premise F
2
.2
0
. A larger endowment lowers the hazard:
8x; a
1
; a
2
[E(x; a
1
) < E(x; a
2
)!M (x; a
1
) > M (x; a
2
)]:
This formula also diers from [Premise F
2
.2] in one respect: its variables
are bound by a universal quantier instead of the generic quantier.
These reformulated premises imply the following theorems:
Theorem F
2
.1
0
. The hazard increases with age within the period of initial
endowment:
8x; a
1
; a
2
[(a
1
< a
2
< )!M (x; a
1
) < M (x; a
2
)]:
This proposition is a restricted version of Theorem F
2
.1, but it is universal,
without exceptions.
Theorem F
1
.1
0
. The hazard declines with age after the period of initial en-
dowment:
8x; a
1
; a
2
[( < a
1
< a
2
)!M (x; a
1
) > M (x; a
2
)]:
This proposition is a also restricted, universal version of Theorem F
1
.1.
Theorem U
1
.3
0
. The hazard increases over intervals that span :
8x; a
1
; a
2
[(a
1
<  < a
2
)!M (x; a
2
) > M (x; a
1
)]:
This proposition is also a universal, but restricted, version of Theorem
U
1
.3.
Since this process freezes the theory in ux into a theory proper, these
new versions of what had been derived generalizations can freely be used in
further derivations. If there is nothing that would override the arguments that
supported them, they are just as safe as the empirical generalizations. They are
monotonic, their inferential behavior follows classical FoL.
Now, as far as the considerations of age dependence in organizational mortal-
ity are concerned, they could be combined by means of a nonmonotonic logic to
provide interesting (in part unexpected) patterns, but extensive further research
is needed before freezing the theory in ux into a theory becomes a tempting
possibility for the research program.
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To regain consistency after the unication, the reliability/accountability-
based argument has been restricted to ages above the endowment-protected
youth of organizations. It is not at all obvious that this restriction is well
motivated substantively. Strong intuition suggests that quite the contrary; at
very young age the gain in reliability and accountability is greater than in older
ages.
To nd a consistent way of unifying the arguments such that basic intuitions
are not violated would require dependable knowledge of four functional forms
for all populations of organizations:
 How (exactly) are aging and the growth of reliability and accountability
related?
 How (exactly) does the growth of reliability and accountability inuence
the hazard?
 How (exactly) are aging and the level of endowment related?
 How (exactly) does the level of endowment inuence the hazard?
The empirical research is not quite ready to deliver all these functional forms
in the near future.
On the other hand, any publication commits its authors to a particular stage
of the theory. From the point of view of the publication the theory in ux freezes
when it gets published, and any classical rst-order conclusion of that theory
can and will be used against the authors.
8 Conclusion
We have proposed a new approach to unifying fragments of theory programs
undergoing development. This approach requires the use of some logical tools
not yet deployed in sociology, as well as some innovation in shaping the tools
themselves.
We tried to illustrate the potential value of these developments by apply-
ing them to a well-studied yet still-recalcitrant problem: age dependence in
organizational mortality processes. Thus we confront a situation in which sev-
eral reasonably well developed theory fragments have withstood an attempt to
bring make a coherent single theory expressed in standard form: rst-order logic
(Hannan 1998). We took it as a challenge to show that an appropriately formed
nonmonotonic logic would succeed where the classical tools had not.
We claim that our approach has passed this test. We came up with a formal-
ization that incorporates several theory fragments that could not be reconciled
in formalizations based upon rst-order logic. Moreover, we arrived at a con-
sistent picture that surprised us. We worked hard at getting the local structure
of the process right by concentrating on the specic arguments that applied to
given phases of the organizational life course. What we did not expect to emerge
from this eort is the strongly consistent global structure. When we shift from
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the ground-level view to a birdseye view, we see that the mortality hazard is
higher in each later phase than in each earlier phase, despite the fact that the
hazard does not rise monotonically within the phases. This unintended result
seems pleasing, because much well designed empirical research has begun to nd
such a global pattern.
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